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I. INTRODUCTION
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, (RICO),' was a far-
reaching attempt by Congress to wage war on organized crime. In-
cluded in the RICO arsenal are a variety of both civil sanctions
and criminal penalties. Congress, in an attempt to snare would-be
Vito Corleones, enacted laws that authorize attorney's fees and
treble damages for practically any claim in which fraud can be
proven.2
To invoke either the civil sanctions contained in 18 U.S.C. §
19643 or the criminal penalties located in 18 U.S.C. § 1963,1 it must
1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)).
2. RICO is not limited in scope to claims arising from acts of fraud. Fraud simply
encompasses a great number of activities and is at the root of most of the current civil RICO
litigation.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
1
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be established that the defendants engaged in conduct which is
prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1962.' The activity which is proscribed
by section 1962 is that a "person" shall not have a relationship
"through" or "from" a "pattern of racketeering activity" with an
"enterprise." 6
The elements of "person," "enterprise," and "pattern of racke-
teering activity" are all broadly defined in section 1961.7 Racke-
teering activity is any act in the laundry list of state and federal
crimes, which in RICO jargon are known as predicate offenses.8 A
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). Private plaintiffs virtually ignored the civil remedy provi-
sions of RICO until the late 1970's. The only two reported cases prior to 1978 are King v.
Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1972); and Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
All but one of the opinions issued in RICO suits are responses to various pretrial mo-
tions. See infra note 14. A few cases have proceeded to the appellate level. The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has issued one opinion in a civil RICO suit. See infra note 31. The
United States Supreme Court has addressed RICO issues twice, both in the criminal con-
text. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); United States v. Russello, 104 S. Ct.
296 (1983).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982) provides in part:
(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property;
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact al-
though not a legal entity;
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last
of which occurred within ten years ... after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) provides:
(1) "[R]acketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of
the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to
bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), section 471, 472, and 473 (relat-
ing to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if
the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzle-
ment from pension and welfare funds), section 891-894 (relating to extortionate
credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling infor-
mation), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire
fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to
obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of
State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with com-
merce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953
(relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (re-
lating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibi-
tion of illegal gambling businesses), section 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen property), section 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in
contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any
2
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pattern can be established by showing that the two predicate of-
fenses occurred within a ten-year period.' Person and enterprise
are both defined broadly enough to include any private, business,
or governmental entity."0
The focus of this comment is the developing body of law per-
taining to the application of the civil remedy provisions of RICO.
Section 1964 states that "[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 . . . may sue
therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."" A civil RICO plaintiff
need not allege any prior criminal conviction and may establish a
case by a preponderance of the evidence." RICO also contains a
liberal construction clause which mandates that RICO be broadly
construed in order to accomplish its purposes. 13
Civil RICO is just beginning to undergo judicial scrutiny. Only
one RICO suit has gone to judgment. 4 Judges are generally split
into two camps: those who dismiss complaints because of an un-
derlying belief RICO should only apply to gangsters, and those
who deny motions to dismiss because the language of RICO is ex-
tremely broad.' 5
act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing
with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c)
(relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud
connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the feloni-
ous manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or other-
wise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the
United States.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
10. For a discussion of the definition of person, see infra text accompanying notes 17
to 39. For a discussion of the definition of enterprise, see infra text accompanying notes 89
to 108.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1983).
12. E.g. Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978);
Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1979). But see G.
Strafer, R. Massumi & H. Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Dar-
ling", 19 Am. CRiM. L. REV. 655, 715-18 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Public Interest]. The
authors make a compelling argument for imposing a "clear and convincing" standard of
proof in civil RICO suits.
13. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84
Stat. 947 (1970).
14. Hirsch v. Enright, 577 F. Supp. 339 (D.N.J. 1983).
15. For a sample of recent cases which adopt the restrictive view, see, Kaufman v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,678 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15,
1984); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Cases that adopt a literal interpretation include Swanson
v. Wabash, Inc., No. 83-0459 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1983); Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 570 F.
Supp. 667 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Gil-
1984]
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RICO does not appear to have been separated into discrete
elements universally recognized by courts and commentators. 6 In
order to state a RICO claim for treble damages, this author be-
lieves there are ten separate elements under sections 1964, 1962
and 1961. There must be (1) a person-victim (2) injured in busi-
ness or property (3) by reason of (4) a person-defendant (5) from
or through (6) a pattern (7) of racketeering activity (8) having a
relationship with-i.e., investing racketeering proceeds in, control-
ling, working, or associating in the affairs of (9) an enterprise (10)
which is involved in interstate commerce.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF A SECTION 1962 VIOLATION
A. A Person-Defendant
It is necessary to show that a violation of section 1962 oc-
curred before a plaintiff can recover treble damages under section
1964. One of the elements of a section 1962 violation is that some
"person" engaged in the proscribed conduct. Natural persons, cor-
porations, and even the estate of a decedent are persons for the
purposes of RICO.17 Because of the broad definition of "person" in
section 1961(3), one might think that this would not be vigorously
disputed.
Two theories have been used with limited success to show that
plaintiffs have not satisfied this element. In one line of cases, de-
fendants have prevailed by arguing that it is improper to allege
that an entity is both the "person" and the "enterprise.'" 8 Some
courts have also held that "person" includes only participants in
organized crime. 9
Some district courts have, in effect, changed the language of
the statute to mean any person connected with organized crime.20
bert v. Bagley, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,483 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 7, 1982).
16. The Second Circuit has however recently stated that there are seven elements to a
violation of section 1962. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1983) (No. 83-950). A civil plaintiff must also
establish that the requirements of section 1964(c) are satisfied in order to recover damages.
17. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D.
Ind. 1982).
18. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D. Mass.
1982); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
19. The organized crime nexus was first set forth in Barr v. WUI/TAS, 66 F.R.D. 109
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). This original rejection of civil RICO has been cited with approval or been
implicitly adopted by district courts that refuse to accept the prevailing view. See, e.g., Noo-
nan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
20. Or perhaps, as Professor Blakey put it, "The defendants in Bennett, in effect,
asked the court to redraft § 1964(c) as follows: 'Any person [injured by organized crime] in
[Vol. 45
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Typically, those courts have based their interpretation on the "ex-
pression of congressional purpose to deal with organized crime's
control over business."'" There are a number of policy considera-
tions that support such an interpretation. The standard floodgates
argument has been used by defendants,2 courts23 and commenta-
tors24 who call for restriction of RICO. Others have also stated that
private plaintiffs have other remedies under state and federal law
based on the defendant's commission of the predicate act upon
which the RICO claim is based.2 5 It has even been suggested that
an expanding use of RICO's civil remedy provisions would impede
enforcement of its criminal sanctions.2 ' The common undercurrent
expressed or implied in the cases restricting application of RICO
civil remedies is the notion "that RICO should apply only to ac-
his business or property ... may sue therefor . . .' The italicized words, of course, do not
appear in the statute as drafted by Congress." Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 285 n.145 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Blakey, Reflections]. This excellent article is the most thoroughly docu-
mented and comprehensive review of a topic that has undergone rigorous scrutiny by nu-
merous commentators. Professor Blakey is currently working on a treatise on RICO to be
published in 1984.
Professor Blakey is also given credit for the actual drafting of RICO during his tenure
as Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Law and Procedures of the
United States Senate. Other articles on various aspects of civil RICO include: Patton, Civil
RICO: Statutory and Implied Elements of the Treble Damage Remedy, 14 TEx. TECH L.
REV. 377 (1983); Parrish, RICO Civil Remedies: An Untapped Resource for Insurers, 49 INS.
COuNS. J. 337 (1982); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Re-
striction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982); Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back
into RICO: Sections 1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 100 (1981); Long, Treble Damages
for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the
RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201 (1981); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Reme-
dies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts].
21. Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); cf. Barr v. WUI/
TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (The Act "was aimed not at legitimate busi-
ness organizations but at combating 'a society of criminals ....'); Adair v. Hunt Int'l
Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("[TIhe conduct complained of here
is so far removed from the purposes of the legislation that it is not within the ambit of the
statute.").
22. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
509 (1983).
23. E.g., Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D.
La. 1981).
24. E.g., Patton, supra note 20, at 431 (pointing out that practically all commercial
claims contain facts that would support a treble damages RICO claim).
25. Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1981). This
policy argument may hold some weight in a securities context, but the commonly alleged
predicate acts of wire and mail fraud do not contain a private remedy. See Ryan v. Ohio
Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1178 (6th Cir. 1979); Napper v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, Brad-
ford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975).
26. Letter from William J. Fitzpatrick, General Counsel of Securities Industry Associ-
ation, to Department of Treasury (October 20, 1983).
5
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tions involving organized crime activities, and not to everyday civil
actions . 27
There are, of course, policy considerations that favor the lib-
eral interpretation of RICO. One reason offered is that other reme-
dies have not been effective in slowing the multi-billion dollar
drain on the economy caused by fraud.2 8 While legislative history
is also somewhat persuasive, 9 the most convincing argument is
that the language of RICO is entirely barren of any reference to
organized crime. Thus, the prevailing view rejects the requirement
that the defendant be linked to organized crime.30
The other approach defendants have used with some success is
to claim that the plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a violation
of section 1962 because the person-defendant is the same entity as
the enterprise. In Rae v. Union Bank,3 1 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an entity may not be both the defendant and
the enterprise. The court did not elaborate on its reasons for doing
so, but simply adopted a statement made by the Fourth Circuit in
a criminal RICO prosecution.2
The Eighth Circuit dismissed a count of a complaint in which
"an 'enterprise' was not alleged apart from the 'person' who was
27. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La.
1981).
28. See Blakey, Reflections, supra note 20, at 342-47.
29. For example, Congress had considered an amendment which made a link to organ-
ized crime an element of RICO, but members of the House rejected the amendment because
some expressed the fear that such a limitation would create an unconstitutional status of-
fense. 116 CONG. REC. 35,343-46 (1970).
For a much more extensive discussion of the legislative history of RICO see either
Blakey, Reflections, supra note 20, at 249-80 or Public Interest, supra note 12, at 681-85.
30. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 52
U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1983) (No. 83-950); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d
449, 457 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 177 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053,
1063 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
31. Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Willamette Say. & Loan
v. Blake & Neal Finance Co., No. 82-1507-PA, (D. Or. Jan. 6, 1984); Van Schaick v. Church
of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D. Mass. 1982); Bays v. Hunter Say. Ass'n, 539
F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20,
23-24 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 357
(E.D. Mich. 1983); In re Longhorn Sec. Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 255 (W.D. Okla. 1983). But
see Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); D'Iorio v.
Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 233 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Mooney v. Fidelity Union Bank, No. 82-
3192 (D.N.J. March 22, 1983). In Mooney, the court adopted the rationale of United States
v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 815, 834 (1983), a
criminal prosecution involving a scheme to defraud the government by providing noncon-
forming goods in which the court held a corporation may be named simultaneously as a
person and an enterprise.
32. United States v. Computer Services, Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 729 (1983).
[Vol. 45
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'associated with' an enterprise.""3 One of the defendants was JKV,
the corporation that owned and operated a life-care retirement fa-
cility. The plaintiffs alleged a scheme to defraud the residents in
which JKV was the entity, and in addition to other relief sought
reorganization of JKV.3 4 By seeking such relief, the plaintiff put
JKV in the role of "the 'person' responsible for conducting the af-
fairs of an enterprise .... ""
In his dissent from the en banc majority opinion, Judge
McMillian concluded a corporation could "simultaneously be both
a person and an enterprise under RICO."36 The dissent relied in
part upon the article by Professor Blakey 7 that criticized the anal-
ysis of the first Eighth Circuit opinion in Bennett.
In the context of a criminal case, the United States Supreme
Court has stated that the separate elements of "enterprise" and
"pattern of racketeering activity" may be established by the same
proof.38 One might argue this provides support for the theory that
a "person" and an "enterprise" may sometimes be the same entity.
Until the Court faces this issue in a civil RICO suit, a prudent
practitioner should be able to avoid this problem by carefully
drafting the complaint.3 9
B. From or Through, a Pattern of, Racketeering Activity
1. Racketeering Activity
To establish a violation of section 1962, a plaintiff must prove
that the conduct complained of amounted to racketeering activity.
Racketeering activity is very broadly defined in section 1961. The
33. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061 (8th Cir. 1982), a/I'd on rehearing, 710 F.2d
1361, 1365 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983). The district court dis-
missed two counts of the RICO claim. The panel decision reversed the district court as to
one count and affirmed as to the other count. The en banc court reached the same conclu-
sion as the panel.
34. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1057 (8th Cir. 1982).
35. Id. at 1061.
36. Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (McMillian, J.,
dissenting in part).
37. Id. at 1365-66. Professor Blakey stated that in situations "where the enterprise is a
'prize' or 'victim'" of the scheme, the purpose of RICO would not be served by imposing
either civil or criminal sanctions. But when the enterprise is a "perpetrator" or even in some
instances an "instrument" in the scheme, "the remedial purposes of RICO tip the judgment
toward finding civil liability .... " Blakey, Reflections, supra note 20, at 323-24.
38. United States v. Turkette, 425 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
39. In Bennett, 685 F.2d 685 F.2d at 1062-63, the court suggested that if the plaintiff
had expressly pleaded the retirement facility was the enterprise and the corporation was the
person, the issue could have been avoided. In most situations it should be possible to find
separate entities for the separate requirements.
1984]
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predicate acts40 include an exhaustive list of state and federal
crimes.4 1 A pattern is established by showing that at least two
predicate acts occurred, the second act within ten years of the
first.42 Some courts have held that the word "through '4- adds an
additional requirement of a relationship between the enterprise
and racketeering activity."
Some of the more common offenses that may give rise to a
civil RICO claim are mail fraud, wire fraud, and fraud in the sale
of securities. 5 These particular predicate acts are also quite
broadly defined.4 6 Courts have held that an allegation was suffi-
ciently stated for mail fraud, even though the communications
were sent only among defendants and third parties;4 7 and for fraud
in the sale of securities where the fraud was allegedly committed
by the purchaser. 8
A recent decision by the Second Circuit, Moss v. Morgan
Stanley Inc.,49 shows that a situation that clearly contains the nec-
essary facts must be properly pleaded, or the case may be dis-
40. "Predicate acts" is the synonym widely used by courts and commentators for of-
fenses contained in the definition of racketeering activity. One explanation for this usage is
given in Parrish, supra note 20, at 240 n.15, where the author suggests that a prudent plain-
tiff avoid drafting complaints that bring forth an image of a racketeer or gangster
defendant.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). For text of statute, see supra note 8.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). For text of statute, see supra note 7.
43. See infra note 62.
44. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509
(1983).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
46. E.g., Salisbury v. Chapman, 527 F. Supp. 577, 579 (N.D. Il. 1981). (In a RICO
claim, the plaintiff must establish the existence of "(1) a scheme to defraud; and (2) use of
the mail in furtherance of that scheme."). These elements of fraud require proof of specific
intent to defraud. United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 1980).
Whether or not RICO requires an additional mental state beyond that which is con-
tained in the predicate act is an unsettled question. One court held RICO does not require
proof of an additional "scienter element." United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980). That interpretation was later questioned in United
States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 661 (8th Cir. 1982). Perhaps the cases may be distinguished
on the basis that Bledsoe involved a violation of RICO conspiracy, section 1962(d), and
Boylan involved a violation of section 1962(c). For a more sophisticated analysis of this
issue, see Blakey, Reflections, supra note 20, at 295-96 n.151. See also Austin v. Merrill
Lynch, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
One commentator has stated that "garden variety deceptive conduct by the most up-
standing white collar-types almost invariably involve[s] mail and wire fraud violations."
Parrish, supra note 20, at 343.
47. D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 229 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
48. Spencer Cos., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,214 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
49. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1983)
(No. 83-950).
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missed.50 In Moss a defendant was eventually convicted on crimi-
nal charges of mail fraud.5 1 The complaint alleged only a 10(b)-5
violation5 2 based on trading on insider information. When the
court held as a matter of law that the defendant had not violated
that specific provision,"3 it dismissed the complaint even though
the defendant's "prior conviction for mail fraud, as well as security
fraud . . . could provide the proof of the predicate acts of 'racke-
teering' that is presently absent from the complaint." 4
2. Pattern
The plaintiff must allege that the racketeering activity oc-
curred in a "pattern." This requirement that two predicate acts be
committed within a ten-year period should not ordinarily present a
significant problem in obtaining standing to allege a RICO count in
a civil fraud action. The prevailing viewpoint appears to be that a
series of individual mailings 5 or a series of fraudulent statements
concerning a security" delivered as part of a single plan are inde-
pendent violations sufficient to satisfy the pattern requirement.
There was, however, one case in which the district court held that
multiple bribes pursuant to one plan to rig a vote regarding a cable
TV franchise were not distinct predicate acts.
Civil plaintiffs may have to plead that the two predicate acts
were related by a common plan in order to satisfy the "pattern"
requirement. Although this issue has apparently not been dis-
cussed in the civil context of RICO, it has been raised a number of
times in criminal cases. The Ninth5 and Seventh59 Circuits have
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id. at 9 n.6. Collateral estoppel should be available, if properly pleaded, to prevent
a defendant convicted of a crime from relitigating those facts. See Anderson v. Janovich,
543 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547
F. Supp. 633, 644 (D. Alaska 1982); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540
F. Supp. 673, 682-83 (N.D. Ind. 1982). Conversely, collateral estoppel has been used to pre-
vent a plaintiff from bringing a RICO claim when the same facts were the basis of a civil
securities fraud suit. Berns v. O'Dell, 563 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd per curiam,
No. 83-1750 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 1984). Cf. County of Cook v. MidCon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902,
913-19 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (litigation in state courts prevented relitigation of issues in federal
court).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
53. Moss, 719 F.2d at 14.
54. Id. at 19 n.15.
55. Erlbaum v. Erlbaum [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,772, at
93,921 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982). See infra note 86.
56. Spencer Cos., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,215-16 (D. Mass Nov. 17, 1981).
57. Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 12-13 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
58. United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
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stated that the "pattern" is established by showing that the predi-
cate acts were connected to each other. The Second6" and Fifth6
Circuits have stated that predicate acts do not need to be interre-
lated. Since the plain language of RICO contains no common
scheme requirement, it would appear to be proper not to create
such a limitation.
3. Nexus Between Racketeering Activity and Enterprise
The word "through" is apparently an element necessary to
show a violation of section 1962.2 It requires allegation and proof
of a nexus between the predicate acts and the enterprise. 3 In
Schacht v. Brown,6" the court stated "that neither common law
fraud nor securities law violates [sic] will, by themselves, be auto-
matically eligible for redress through a civil RICO action; there is
an additional requirement under section 1964(c) . . . that an inter-
state enterprise be conducted 'through' a pattern of such
activity. 65
In Schacht, the defendant was the parent corporation of the
enterprise-subsidiary. The suit was brought by the receiver of the
insolvent enterprise-subsidiary. The alleged predicate acts were
acts of mail fraud committed by the defendant-parent on the state
insurance regulators in an effort to loot the enterprise-subsidiary.
The complaint alleged violation of section 1962(a) and (c).16 The
Ct. 1194 (1983).
59. United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826
(1981).
60. United States v. Weissman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
871 (1980).
61. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) and (c) both contain the phrase "through a pattern of racke-
teering." It is also apparently an element of subsection (d), which prohibits any conspiracy
to violate subsection (a), (b), or (c). Subsection (a), dealing with the "RICO investor," pro-
hibits persons from investing in an enterprise with "any income derived, directly or indi-
rectly from a pattern of racketeering activity .. " (emphasis added).
63. Whether the nexus requirement is the same for each subsection is not clear. In all
of the cases discussed in this part of the comment, the discussion of nexus was raised in the
context of § 1962(c). In Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1360 n.22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 509 (1983), the court did state that the nexus requirement for subsection (d) was
the same as for subsection (c).
64. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983).
65. Id. at 1355.
66. Id. at 1358-59. The court addressed this issue in response to the defendant's asser-
tion that there was no "competitive injury." This requirement, adopted first in N. Barring-
ton Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 210-11 (N.D. Ill. 1980), is an attempt to with-
draw the protection of RICO from persons injured directly by the predicate act, and limit
the recovery to those indirectly injured (i.e. customers or competitors of the enterprise). For
a further elaboration of a "competitive injury" requirement, see infra text accompanying
10
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court stated that the instant case was a clearer example of an in-
jury brought about through the predicate acts than the cases 67 "in
which the plaintiff corporations were damaged by a scheme of
bribes and kickbacks conducted through the plaintiff corporation,
thus entailing financial losses which stemmed directly from the
commission of the predicate offenses."6 8
Another example of an argument based on this nexus require-
ment is contained in a case where the defendants allegedly bought
stock in an entity and later committed the offenses. 9 The defen-
dants argued that the acquisition was independent of and not con-
ducted "through" the predicate acts. The district court rejected
the defendants' "unduly restrictive" interpretation of the word
"through" and adopted the rationale contained in a prior criminal
RICO case that required the enterprise to be connected either to
the defendant by his position in the enterprise, or to the racketeer-
ing activities. 70
C. The RICO relationship
Every violation of section 1962 requires proof of a certain rela-
tionship between the person-defendant and the enterprise. The
type of relationship that the defendant has with the enterprise
would determine which subsection of section 1962 would be proper
to allege. Subsection (a) proscribes investment of racketeering pro-
ceeds, to establish or operate an enterprise. Subsection (b) pros-
cribes the acquisition of or control of an enterprise. Subsection (c)
proscribes an employee or associate from conducting or participat-
ing in the affairs of an enterprise. Subsection (d) proscribes con-
spiring to violate subsection (a), (b), or (c). 71
Section 1962(c) seems to be the most frequently alleged
claim. 2 The two requirements of RICO that are peculiar to this
notes 115-28.
67. Computer Terminal Systems, Inc. v. Gross, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,531
(E.D.N.Y. 1981); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
68. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1359 (emphasis in original).
69. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742 (N.E. Ohio June 11, 1982).
70. Id. at 98,738-39. The court adopted the test announced in United States v. Scotto,
641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981). A criminal RICO case that
interprets provisions applicable to both civil and criminal cases (i.e., those contained in §
1962) should be dispositive authority. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576
(1981) (interpreting the scope of "enterprise").
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1983).
72. This author is aware of 16 appellate cases addressing a civil RICO issue, six specif-
ically addressing violations of 1962(c): USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d
94, 95 (6th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 n.8 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on
1984]
11
Dzivi: Civil Rico
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1984
98 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
subsection ("conduct or participate" in an enterprise's affairs, and
"employed by or associated with any enterprise") have been specif-
ically addressed by few courts facing a civil RICO claim.
There is no clear line of demarcation as to which acts consti-
tute participation or conduct in the affairs of an enterprise, but
"RICO does not apply where the charged enterprise provides only
a setting for racketeering activities wholly unrelated to its own
purposes and affairs."73 In one case the defendants had argued
that this requirement was not satisfied because the enterprise's af-
fairs were limited to building and maintaining the physical struc-
ture on the land.74 The court rejected their argument and con-
cluded that "the affairs" of the enterprises included the financing
of the project.7 5 The Eighth Circuit has added some uncertainty to
this issue. In Bennett v. Berg,76 the en banc court stated that "[a]
defendant's participation must be in. . . the affairs of a RICO en-
terprise, which ordinarily will require some participation in the op-
eration or management of the enterprise itself." Unfortunately, the
court only raised the issue and did not elaborate because it had not
been raised by the defendant. 7
"Employed or associated with" does not limit section 1962(c)
only to defendants "who are . . . managers or employees in the
colloquial sense .... ,,78Another court has stated that the mort-
rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983);
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509 (1983); Moss v.
Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S.
Dec. 8, 1983) (No. 83-950); Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co., No. 83-1308 (7th Cir. Feb. 9, 1984);
Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984). Two other cases contained allegations of
multiple violations apparently including a violation of 1962(c). Bunker Ramo Corp. v.
United States Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1286 (7th Cir. 1983); Ingram Corp. v. J.
Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1983). Two cases arise apparently solely
from allegations of 1962(a). Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1983);
Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 177
(1982).
Five cases are brief dispositions of the RICO claims in which it is not clear that any
specific subsection was alleged. Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983);
Berns v. O'Dell, No. 83-1750 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 1984); Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank of At-
lanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 1983); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1983); Cullen
v. Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226 (2nd Cir. 1980).
One case was unreported. Grayson v. Wooden, No. 80-5460 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 1982).
73. Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 1155.
75. Id. The court supported its conclusion with a similar holding from a criminal
RICO case. United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 785-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (initial
financing of a theatre was part of the theatre's affairs).
76. 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
77. Id.
78. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1360 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that auditors
and corporation with contract ties to the enterprise were sufficiently associated with the
12
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gage lender and accountants of the enterprise were sufficiently as-
sociated with the enterprise.79 This requirement appears to be a
minimal obstruction in overcoming a motion to dismiss in a civil
RICO suit.
Section 1962(a) is designed to prevent the investment of
"dirty money" in the acquisition of an interest in an enterprise."0
Section 1962(a) has been dispositive in only one reported civil
RICO case. In Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi. Cable, Ltd.,a1
the defendant had previously pleaded guilty to criminal mail and
wire fraud counts. The plaintiff brought a motion for summary
judgment. The motion was denied because although "the [plaintiff]
asserts that the income [defendant] received could not conceivably
have been used for any purpose not covered by RICO, it has
presented no evidence to show what use was actually made of any
income improperly derived."8 2 In a criminal case, a court took the
position that racketeering money indirectly invested into an enter-
prise was sufficient to show that defendant had violated section
1962(a)." None of the other reported civil cases in which a claim
was raised under section 1962(a) discuss this requirement.
Section 1962(b) makes it unlawful "to acquire or maintain...
any interest in or control of any enterprise . . . ."85 Two reported
cases have specifically addressed a separate allegation of 1962(b).
Alleging use of the mails to obtain reissuance of stock was suffi-
cient for the purposes of section 1962(b) because the predicate act
resulted "in [the defendant's] acquisition of a greater interest in
the [stock] than he otherwise would have. '8 6 The allegation of
filing a series of fraudulent amendments in order to facilitate the
acquisition of stock is sufficient to establish a violation of section
enterprise).
79. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 n.16, aff'd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361, 1365
(8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
81. 547 F. Supp. 633 (D. Alaska 1982).
82. Id. at 644.
83. United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980).
84. Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 530 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. I1. 1981);
Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983); Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott &
Co., 495 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D. La. 1980); Gitterman v. Vitoulis, 564 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1982). The relative scarcity of suits alleging a violation under section 1962(a) may be due to
what one commentator states is the "extremely burdensome task" in tracing money back to
a tainted source. Patton, supra note 20, at 403.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982).
86. Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 98,772, at
93,922 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982) (stock originally issued to plaintiff and defendant as joint
tenants reissued only in the name of the defendant).
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1962(b).8
Generally, it can be said that a defendant's contention that
plaintiff made an insufficient allegation of RICO relationship will
be unlikely to result in dismissal. As one commentator has stated,
the defendant's argument in this area is generally "little more than
an effort to touch all the bases in resisting the plaintiff's suit."88
D. An Enterprise Engaged in Interstate Commerce
1. Enterprise
The element that must be properly alleged in any RICO claim
is the existence of an enterprise. The definition of enterprise in
section 1961 is open-ended. 9 Plaintiffs have successfully alleged
that an "enterprise" includes: a city agency,90 a city council,91 a
decedent's estate,9 2 a corporation alone,98 a corporation and associ-
ated individuals, 4 a limited partnership, 5 and an association of
individuals.9 6
The United States Supreme Court has broadly construed "en-
terprise." In United States v. Turkette,17 the narrow question the
court faced was whether the "enterprise" element was confined to
legitimate organizations, excluding an entity whose functions were
entirely illegal. The court stated "There is no restriction upon the
associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any
87. Spencer Cos., v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,216 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
88. Blakey, Reflections, supra note 20, at 328.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982). For text of statute, see supra note 7. The definition of
enterprise uses the word "includes" as opposed to the restrictive definition of racketeering
activity which uses the word "means." State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton,
540 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
90. State v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1980).
91. Teleprompter of Erie, Inc., v. City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
92. Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
93. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (complaint am-
biguous as to what constituted an enterprise, but corporate defendant alone would satisfy
the enterprise requirement).
94. Computer Terminal Systems, Inc. v. Gross, Trade Cas. 1982-1 (CCH) T 64,531, at
72,946 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). But see Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 567
F. Supp. 1146, 1151 (D.N.J. 1983) (plaintiff's failure to plead corporations and associated
individuals act as legal entity fatal because such a combination could not be considered an
association in fact of individuals).
95. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
96. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). For an
extensive list of all the types of business, government, and private groups that have been
classified as enterprises in both civil and criminal cases, see Blakey, Reflections, supra note
20, at 298-300 nn.152-65.
97. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
14
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union or group of individuals associated in fact."98
The First Circuit had rejected the notion that a "pattern of
racketeering" could also be the "enterprise." 99 The Supreme Court
stated that "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering" were sepa-
rate elements, but "the proof used to establish these separate ele-
ments may in particular cases coalesce . *..."100 The proof neces-
sary to the "enterprise" element can be established by "evidence of
an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that
the various associates function as a continuing unit." 101
The Supreme Court's statement should have ended the uncer-
tainty as to whether the "enterprise" requires proof distinct from
the proof offered to establish a "pattern of racketeering activity."
However, in Bennett, the panel of judges concluded that "[b]y re-
quiring proof of an 'enterprise,' RICO requires proof of a fact other
than the facts required to prove the predicate acts of racketeer-
ing."102 The view more consistent with Turkette is that of the Sec-
ond Circuit, which in a civil case103 rejected the analysis in
Bennett.
The Supreme Court's use of the language "ongoing organiza-
tion" and "continuing unit" have given lower courts more concepts
to ponder, but the results indicate that varying constructions of
"enterprise" can be read into the Turkette language. An example
of a narrow view is given in Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v.
Southmost Machinery Corp.,104 where the court rejected plaintiff's
argument that a corporation was sufficiently alleged to be an ongo-
ing organization because that interpretation "would .. .drasti-
cally expand federal jurisdiction over all business torts which in-
volve use of the mails 6r telephones."10 5 Not surprisingly, the
complaint was dismissed. 0 6 In Kimmel v. Peterson,0 " however, the
98. Id. at 580. The court declared that the definition of enterprise included two cate-
gories-legal entities and all other associations. Id. at 582.
99. Id. (quoting United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899 (1st Cir. 1980)).
100. 452 U.S. at 583.
101. Id.
102. 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 136 (8th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983). The en banc court did not address this issue.
103. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d at 22. See also Austin v. Merrill Lynch,
Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667, 669 n.2 (W.D. Mich. 1983). The Ninth Circuit has also rejected the
Bennett approach in a criminal RICO case. United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 890-91
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982).
104. 567 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1983). The court found three elements necessary for a
RICO enterprise: ongoing operation, continuing unit for common purpose, and separation
between enterprise and racketeering activity. Id. at 1151-53.
105. Id. at 1152.
106. Id. at 1158.
107. 565 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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court rejected the defendant's contention that a limited partner-
ship brokerage service was not an ongoing organization for the rea-
son that the partnership apparently rendered some legitimate
product to customers.108 It seems apparent that if the judge in
Kimmel had been confronted with the Seville facts, he would have
found some legitimate product was distributed and would have
held that the "ongoing organization" requirement was satisfied.
Likewise, the judge in Seville most likely would have found the
Kimmel facts to be another garden variety business fraud outside
the scope of RICO.
2. Interstate Commerce
In addition to alleging an enterprise, the plaintiff must allege a
nexus with interstate commerce.109 This requirement is satisfied if
any activities (racketeering or otherwise) of the enterprise affect
interstate commerce. 110 Courts usually reject arguments that no
nexus is possible; mere receipt of supplies shipped into the state is
sufficient to meet the requirement."' Even in a case where plain-
tiffs failed to allege interstate commerce the court refused to dis-
miss the complaint and allowed plaintiff to file an amended
complaint. 112
III. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO INVOKE CIVIL REMEDIES
The elements of RICO previously discussed are those neces-
sary to establish a violation of section 1962. A violation of section
1962 is a prerequisite to either a civil or a criminal RICO case. In
addition to those elements, a civil RICO plaintiff must also allege
that (1) a person-victim (2) "was injured in his business or prop-
erty" (3) "by reason of a violation of section 1962."" The element
of person-victim is substantially similar to the element of person-
defendant discussed previously.14 Therefore, the focus here will be
108. Id. at 497.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
110. Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1284 (7th Cir.
1983).
111. See, e.g., Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. v. Noto, 548 F. Supp. 352, 354
(E.D.N.Y. 1982). Cf. Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, 576 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (proper to take judicial notice of the fact hospital purchases goods in interstate
commerce).
112. D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 223, 231 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (There is a "minimal
criteria for finding a nexus.").
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
114. Person is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982). The only possible difference be-
tween person-victim and person-defendant is that the prohibition (in some decisions)
[Vol. 45
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on interpretations of the latter two elements.
Some district courts have construed the language of section
1964(c) authorizing trebles damages to require some type of com-
petitive or commercial injury. " ' This restriction was initially
adopted in order to prevent the transformation of "every bad faith
breach of contract or common law fraud where a plaintiff alleges
that defendants used the mails . . . into a RICO suit."' 6
Some of the later decisions restricting the civil RICO claim
have focused on the phrase "by reason of."11 1 These decisions
would limit RICO recovery to those who suffer indirect harm (cus-
tomers of the entity impacted by the predicate offense), as opposed
to those directly harmed by the predicate offense. This language
has been used to support arguments that Congress, by using lan-
guage similar to that in an antitrust statute," 8 intended to limit
RICO treble damages to some type of new claim (a violation of
section 1962), not to supplement existing remedies for the predi-
cate acts (the racketeering activity defined in section 1961)."1 This
antitrust analysis has been rejected by courts120 and commenta-
tors1 21 because the purposes of antitrust regulation are distinct
from the purposes of RICO, and because RICO does not create
remedies solely for violations of predicate acts. 2 2
against pleading the same entity as enterprise and person-defendant may not apply to situa-
tions where the person-victim is the enterprise. See infra text accompanying notes 17-39.
115. N. Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 210-11 (N.D. Il. 1980). Cf.
Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (requiring a
"racketeering enterprise injury" which is not the same as competitive injury, but would
overlap). In Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass.
1982), the court restricted application of RICO "to business loss from racketeering injuries."
116. N. Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. InI. 1980).
117. Erlbaum v. Erlbaum [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,772
(E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D.
Cal. 1982); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 217-18 (D. Colo. 1983).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
119. Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
Cf. Friedlander v. Nims, 571 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (mere allegation of "damaged
accordingly" does not satisfy causation requirement).
120. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing,
710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 678-80 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F.
Supp. 1575, 1579-80 (E.D. Mich. 1983) ("[A]nalogies to limitations in the antitrust context
are entirely inappropriate here.").
121. See, e.g., Horn, Judicial Plague Sweeps U.S., NAT'L L.J. May 23, 1983, at 19
("The whole 'by reason of' argument is based on an absolutely tortured analogy to a Clayton
Act case, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 447 (1977)."); Patton,
supra note 20, at 415-16.
122. Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1579 (E.D. Mich. 1983) ("Nor is it true that
a RICO 'fraud' claim is identical to a state common law fraud claim. There must be an
enterprise, there must be an effect upon interstate commerce before RICO can come into
17
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Other district courts have determined that RICO requires a
narrow construction of "business or property" injuries, sometimes
referred to as "racketeering injuries." The stated reason for doing
so is to avoid "a slavish literalism that would escort into federal
court through RICO what traditionally have been civil actions pur-
sued in state courts." 123 Although this test, like the preceding com-
petitive injury test, has been criticized 12  because it is never ade-
quately defined, it also appears to be internally inconsistent. The
rationale almost always offered in defense of these limitations is
that the plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that this is
the type of activity (i.e. organized crime) that Congress was seek-
ing to combat.1 25 One case, however, shows if this test were strictly
applied, it would bar suits brought by those injured from criminal
activity beyond the scope of garden-variety business fraud.
In Gitterman v. Vitoulis,1 28 the plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendants operated a carpet cleaning service as a front for the pur-
pose of gaining entry into apartments, stealing diamonds, and re-
placing them with glass duplicates. It would seem to be a classic
example of infiltration of a legitimate business by organized crime,
with a person, enterprise, pattern, and a predicate offense. If the
court had used the "by reason of" test, which disallows recovery
for direct harm, the plaintiff who suffered the loss of jewelry would
not have had standing to sue.1 27 If the court had adopted a com-
petitive or commercial injury test as defined in North Barrington
Development, Inc. v. Fanslow, 28 this plaintiff would have lacked
standing to sue because the loss did not impair any competitive
economic ability.129 Yet the court somehow determined that the
racketeering enterprise injury test had been met, ostensibly be-
cause, although "the loss that the plaintiffs have alleged is purely
effect, and there must also be two predicate offenses.").
123. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D. Mass.
1982). As others have noted, a restriction to property injury should exclude at least personal
injury. Patton, supra note 20, at 417; Parrish, supra note 20, at 344. In Hamman v. United
States, 267 F. Supp. 420, 432 (D. Mont. 1967), appeal dismissed, 399 F.2d 673 (9th Cir.
1968), the court excluded personal injury damages in an antitrust suit.
124. See, e.g., Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
125. See, e.g., Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643-44 (C.D. Cal.
1983).
126. 564 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
127. Id. at 49. Perhaps an insurance company that paid a claim to the person who
suffered the loss should have standing to sue. See Parrish, supra note 20, at 357.
128. 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
129. Id. at 210-11. Perhaps if other carpet cleaners were able to allege loss of business
because the defendants maintained artificially low prices in order to gain entry into apart-
ments, those other carpet cleaners might have standing under a competitive injury
requirement.
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personal, the alleged impact of the activities that the plaintiffs
ascribe to the defendants is not." ' The court twisted the test it
had given in a prior case13 apparently because the particular facts
were so obviously within the spirit and the letter of RICO.
An example of the proper application of the "by reason of"
limitation is Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhodes & Co.,1 32 in which
fraud was the alleged predicate offense. The damages claimed,
however, were the expense and injury to reputation caused by the
filing of a securities claim. Because the damages were caused by an
intervening event (the frivolous securities claim) and not by the
predicate offenses (the alleged fraud), the court held that the "by
reason of" requirement was not satisfied. 33
When defendants have argued either the "by reason of" or
competitive injury or racketeering enterprise injury test to a circuit
court, they have been uniformly rebuffed. 4 The "by reason of"
language of section 1964 should be interpreted literally. Damages
should be allowed for direct and indirect harm caused by conduct
that amounts to a violation of section 1962.15 The "business or
property" phrase should do no more than exclude personal injury
damages."6
A rather novel approach for restricting RICO is given in two
district court decisions holding that the plaintiff must assert
"probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.' ' 37 It
130. Gitterman, 564 F. Supp. at 49. Later, however, the judge did adopt the narrow
"by reason of" test. Gitterman v. Vitoulis, No. 82-5908 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1983)
(order granting summary judgment).
131. Alton v. Alton, No. 82-795 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1982).
132. 530 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Ill. 1981). See also Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp. [Cur-
rent) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,589 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1983).
133. 530 F. Supp. at 1065-66.
134. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir.) ("In short, we believe, like most
other courts, that the erection of a 'competitive' or 'indirect' injury barrier to RICO recovery
comports with neither the plain language nor the central goal of the statute."), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 509 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehear-
ing, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); Moss v. Morgan
Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.) (affirming dismissal of a RICO count but not endorsing the
district court's adoption of a "by reason of" test), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3473
(U.S. Dec. 8, 1983) (No. 83-950).
135. One other commentator has suggested use of a producing cause standard in ap-
plying the "by reason of" test. Patton, supra note 20, at 415-16. One court recently stated
that "by reason of" creates a proximate cause test. Seawell v. Miller Brewing, 576 F. Supp.
424 (M.D.N.C. 1983).
136. See supra note 123.
137. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., 558 F.
Supp. 1042, 1046-47 (D. Utah 1983); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D.
Ga. 1983). The judge in Tracy Collins Bank also believed that a complaint should contain a
bill of particulars. 588 F. Supp. at 1045. Why this concept was introduced is something of a
mystery.
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would seem apparent that the legal issues surrounding civil RICO
litigation are complex enough without including the intricacies of
the fourth amendment."8' If one wishes to impose requirements of
specificity, other traditional civil procedures are available.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF RULE 9(b) TO CIVIL RICO
It is common for a civil RICO claim to be based on the predi-
cate offenses of wire fraud, mail fraud, or fraud in the sale of se-
curities. In such situations, "circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity."' 39 In Bennett v.
Berg,140 the Eighth Circuit applied this rule to the complaint and
concluded that certain allegations were sufficient, and others
should be struck without prejudice.141 The key was whether the
complaint "identiffied] the time, place and contents of the alleged
misrepresentations with particularity.' ' 42
In a well-reasoned decision,'4 3 a district court ruled that a
complaint sufficiently alleges the course of wrongdoing (arising
from the predicate act of securities fraud) when it: (1) specifies the
parties' roles in a securities transaction, (2) details the breaches of
trust, and (3) alleges particular acts of omission and misrepresen-
tation. The defendants had argued that the complaint must con-
tain specific data about each security traded over a two-year pe-
riod. Relying upon the rationale of a Ninth Circuit decision,14 the
court recognized that demanding such an amount of detail was in-
appropriate at the pleading stage before discovery was commenced.
Even in a case where the complaint inadequately alleged only
that defendant used the mails to defraud the plaintiff, the court
did not dismiss the complaint.' 45 Instead, the court granted the
plaintiffs the opportunity to commence discovery and amend their
138. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For a discussion of the concepts included within the
probable cause requirement in criminal law, see W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 3.1-3.7
(1978 & Supp. 1983). This new line of argument would propose a theory of probable cause
that does not fit within the traditional rubric (i.e. probable cause to search, probable cause
to arrest).
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
140. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
141. Id. at 1062-63.
142. Id. at 1062 n.13.
143. Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The case arose from the
facts surrounding a series of investments by a doctor who had allegedly asked for safe in-
vestments and was instead sold a number of high-risk speculative issues.
144. Gottreich v. San Francisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1977) (a non-RICO
securities claim).
145. Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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complaint within sixty days.14 6
V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
RICO does not include a statute of limitations. Some commen-
tators have suggested that federal courts apply the "nearest analo-
gous federal statute.' 14 7 Courts, however, have consistently applied
the nearest state statute of limitations when confronted with the
question in a civil RICO suit."48 If a federal district court in Mon-
tana were to apply Montana law, it would likely use the two-year
period for commencement of an action in fraud.149 One federal
court has stated that federal law, not state law, determines when
the action accrues. 50
VI. VENUE
The first reported civil RICO case was dismissed for improper
venue.' 5 ' Thus, although the special provisions in RICO for
venue' were intended to liberalize' 3 the general venue provi-
sions,' 5 ' the prudent practitioner should be careful to plead the
facts necessary to establish proper venue.
"Any civil [RICO] action. . . against any person may be insti-
tuted in the district court of the United States for any district in
which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his
affairs."'' 5 RICO also includes a provision for joining any party re-
siding in any other district under certain circumstances.'15 Courts
146. Id. at 137-38. In a recent case, a court stated that plaintiff must plead which
specific subsection of § 1962 has been violated. Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1581
(E.D. Mich. 1983).
147. Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts, supra note 20, at 1047. The authors believe
that such a practice would maintain uniformity.
148. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1353-54 (E.D. Pa. 1983); State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 684-85 (N.D. Ind. 1982); D'Iorio v.
Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 232 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Gilbert v. Bagley, [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) $ 99,483 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 1982).
149. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-203 (1983).
150. Gilbert v. Bagley, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,483 (M.D.N.C. Sept.
17, 1982).
151. King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1982).
153. See Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (D. Del. 1978);
Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1132 n.6 (D. Mass. 1982);
Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 139 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (1982) provides in part:
[When] it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in
any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to
be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district
21
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have rejected the theory that the acts of one co-conspirator per-
formed in a district will conclusively establish venue for all co-con-
spirators. 15 The sufficiency of evidence that must be alleged
should not present a significant obstacle to obtaining venue in
most cases. Courts have held that periodic phone calls"'8 or mailing
letters 59 into a district by a defendant were sufficient to establish
venue.
VII. REMEDIES
Although the possibility of securing a judgment for treble
damages is undoubtedly the great spur behind most of the recent
civil RICO actions, other attractive remedies such as attorneys'
fees and injunctive relief are contained in the statute and may be
available to private parties. Most of the appeals courts that have
faced the issue of equitable relief have refused to rule whether the
remedy is available to private parties.8 o Attorneys' fees appear to
be available only upon judgment, not upon obtaining a favorable
settlement."'
There is great uncertainty as to whether private parties are
entitled to general equitable relief. Section 1964(a) grants broad
equitable powers to district courts." 2 Section 1964(b) authorizes
of the United States by the marshal thereof.
157. For rejection of the conspirational theory of venue, see Farmers Bank v. Bell
Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 n.5 (D. Del. 1978); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp.
131, 140 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
158. Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 141 (E.D. Pa. 1983). But see Clement v.
Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436, 443 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
159. Haber v. Kobrin, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 99,259.
(S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1983). But see DeMoss v. First Artist Prod. Co., 571 F. Supp. 409, 411-12
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (adopts restrictive interpretation of "transacts his affairs" by analogizing
to antitrust law and finds venue improper where it is based upon the mailing of fraudulent
statements into the district).
160. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064-65 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 710
F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 507 (1983); USACO Coal Co. v.
Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982) (ruling that district court had granted
preliminary injunction on basis of breach of fiduciary duty, not RICO violation); Dan River,
Ipg.-. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290-91 (4th Cir. 1983); Trane v. O'Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 28-
29 (2d Cir. 1983).
District courts have also sidestepped this issue. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v.
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Trane Co. v.
O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983).
161. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 911-13 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders,
including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest,
direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future
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such relief in suits brought on behalf of the United States.1 3 Sec-
tion 1964(c) authorizes treble damages for private plaintiffs, but is
silent with respect to injunctive relief. 6 4 The language of 1964(c)
can be interpreted as providing monetary damages as an additional
remedy for private plaintiffs,' 35 or as limiting the remedy to mone-
tary damages. 66
One district court granted a temporary injunction,'67 but later
stated it did so based on the traditional standards for obtaining
relief.16  Another court, in a strongly worded opinion, attacked the
notion that equitable relief was available to private plaintiffs. 6 9
The latter court relied heavily upon the legislative history of
RICO, which indicated that (1) section 1964(c) was added almost
as an afterthought to section 1964(a) and (b); and (2) an amend-
ment to RICO specifically authorizing private equitable relief was
withdrawn by its sponsor.17 0 A third court, which refused a request
for an attachment order, stated the equitable remedies in RICO
were designed to prevent violations, not secure judgments.17 ' It ap-
pears that if a plaintiff wishes to secure injunctive relief, he should
plead the traditional requirements, i.e. probability of succeeding
on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of public interest and
harm to others. 7 2
In the only published case that analyzed the availability of at-
torney's fees under RICO, the court held that attorney's fees were
available "only to a plaintiff who has obtained a final judgment on
activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged
in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering disso-
lution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of
innocent persons.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1982) provides:
The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any action
brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed as soon as
practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final determination
thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or
take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance
bonds, as it shall deem proper.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
165. Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts, supra note 20, at 1047.
166. Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
167. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, No. 81-2616 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1981) (or-
der granting preliminary injunction).
168. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 910 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
169. Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 581-84 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
170. Id. at 583.
171. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81, 85 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
172. See USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 96-99 (6th Cir.
1982); Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1983).
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the merits." ' The plaintiff had first secured a temporary injunc-
tion and then a favorable settlement. The court rejected the theory
that plaintiff, as a prevailing party, was entitled to attorney's fees
because the language of section 1964 was more similar to section 4
of the Clayton Act"' (which has been interpreted as requiring
more than a favorable settlement for an award of attorney's fees)' 75
than that of section 16 of the Clayton Act 1 78 (which has been inter-
preted as allowing attorney's fees upon the issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction). 77 This decision has, however, been criticized as
fundamentally incorrect because RICO was not designed to be bur-
dened by the restrictive interpretations of the Clayton Act.178 This
issue will undoubtedly receive more judicial attention in the future
as members of the bar become more familiar with RICO.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Federal district court judges have shown a general reluctance
to open the courts to the new RICO cause of action. The law, how-
ever, is in a state of flux. As the courts of appeals uniformly reject
unduly restrictive interpretations of RICO, it seems clear that the
remedy afforded private litigants under RICO is available for a
very broad range of alleged wrongs.
Since no RICO case law has arisen in Montana, practitioners
should draft complaints cautiously. 179 Where possible, the allega-
tions should be framed in the alternative. For example, where
more than one enterprise is involved, it would be wise to plead
different enterprises in different counts. In a typical fraudulent
transaction, a plaintiff could allege that the defendant's conduct
173. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 912-13 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) provides in part:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
175. City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469-69 (2d Cir. 1974).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) provides in part: "In any action under this section in which
the plaintiff substantially prevails, the court shall award the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee, to such plaintiff."
177. F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
178. Flaherty, Attorney Fee Denied in Civil RICO Settlement, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1,
1983, at 8 (quoting conversation with Professor Blakey).
179. The substance of this paragraph was delivered in an address by Irvin B. Nathan,
A.B.A. National Institute, RICO: The Ultimate Weapon in Business and Commercial Litiga-
tion (Feb. 17, 1984).
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violates both the federal mail' 80 or wire' 8' fraud statute, and the
state deceptive practices law.' 8' The complaint should reflect the
criminality of the defendant's actions, and should specifically al-
lege the elements of the crime that constitutes the predicate of-
fense. When possible, the pleadings should show that the predicate
acts were related to each other. Any facts demonstrating the causal
connection between the violation of section 1962 and the injury
should be included in the complaint. As a tactical consideration, an
attorney should plead any other federal claims because the court
may be less tempted to dismiss a RICO claim if federal jurisdiction
would still exist. Although the availability of equitable relief in pri-
vate suits is in. question, the prayer for relief should include any
appropriate equitable remedy in anticipation of further case law
developments.
The restrictive interpretations of RICO were developed as a
means of protecting "legitimate" businessmen whose conduct fits
the plain meaning of the statute. This rationale is unpersuasive. A
civil RICO judgment is based on criminal activity-the commission
of a predicate offense. Honest entrepreneurs have little to fear
from RICO. Good faith should be a defense to the multitude of
RICO claims arising from fraud.' 83 When frivolous suits present a
significant problem, courts should impose existing civil sanctions' 8'
rather than change the substantive law. Any meaningful restriction
of the breadth of civil RICO should emanate from Congress.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
182. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-317 (1983).
183. E.g., United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1979).
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
1984]
25
Dzivi: Civil Rico
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1984
26
Montana Law Review, Vol. 45 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol45/iss1/4
